Introduction

The law was adopted with 2,756 votes in favor, three against, and three abstentions on March 12, 2026, by the National People’s Congress and promulgated by President Xi Jinping on the very same day, entering into force on July 1, 2026. It contains seven chapters and 65 articles and is the first law adopted at the level of the People’s Republic of China concerning “ethnic unity.”

It formalizes a long-standing doctrinal change that has been taking place since the early years of the 21st century: a departure from the post-1949 doctrine of “ethnic autonomy” and towards assimilationist policies under the guise of “strengthening the sense of common belonging to the Chinese nationality.” According to Beijing, the law aims to foster national unity and common prosperity. However, it has been criticized internationally, by various international organizations and governments, as well as UN special rapporteurs on human rights, and exiled representatives of minorities such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongolians, and others.

From Autonomy to Assimilation

The Chinese Region Ethnic Autonomy Law of 1984 ensured that minorities would enjoy linguistic freedom and development while also warning against Han nationalism. The new law does not have this kind of statement. The philosophical origins of the law stem from the “second generation ethnic policy,” championed by Ma Rong of Peking University and Hu Angang of Tsinghua University, which called for minimizing ethnic consciousness in favor of common national identity. Xi Jinping followed this paradigm at the 2021 Central Ethnic Work Conference when he declared this to be the “principal axis” of all ethnic work in the Party, noting that Han-oriented Chinese culture is the “trunk of a tree” whereas minorities’ cultures are its “branches and leaves.” The term “Chinese nation’s sense of unity” occurs at least 30 times in the text. The CCP demanded the passage of this law at its July 2024 Third Plenum, and on August 29, 2025, the entire Politburo reviewed the draft, the first such Politburo review in almost four decades.

What the Law Requires

Chapter 1 recognizes the “comprehensive leadership” of the Party in matters of ethnic work. Article 6 which makes the “sense of community for the Chinese nation” is the basic principle of ethnic unity and it bans any activities which goes against this. Chapter 2 makes it mandatory for schools to ensure knowledge of the Mandarin language starting from preschool and makes it obligatory for them to display Chinese characters in preference to script of minority languages and to teach children about the “community of the Chinese nation.” Article 20 states that parents should refrain from imparting to children thoughts that could harm “ethnic unity,” and that they should educate children to love the Communist Party. Article 40 calls for a “transformation of outdated customs and traditions.” Religious organizations are supposed to seek the “Sinicization of religion”.

Beijing’s Stated Rationale

The government portrays this legislation as a step forward that serves the best interest of minorities themselves. According to state narratives, it is emphasized that all 420 poor counties under national designation in minority-inhabited regions have been freed from poverty, while the sum total of the gross regional product of the five autonomous regions has increased from 6.01 trillion yuan in 2020 to 8.38 trillion yuan in 2024. It helps build infrastructure, provide education and other social services while fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The most common comparison used is the “pomegranate seeds in China”.

Where the Rationale Breaks Down

The key dilemma here is that of unitariness being pursued through certain means. The law calls for mandatory Mandarin-first education without making it clear whether minority language instruction is to remain a basic right or not. Furthermore, the prohibition from “undermining ethnic unity,” being quite wide, cannot be measured by an objective criterion. It affects a number of ethnicities.

Table 1: Impact Across Ethnic Groups

Table 2: Stated Purpose vs Structural Concerns

The ratifications include International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on the Rights of the Child, and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Eight special rapporteurs from the United Nations have made a statement on April 16, 2026, regarding concerns that this new bill contravenes international conventions when it comes to limiting social and cultural rights, that vague wording will lead to suppression of legal expression and culture, and that favouring Mandarin over other languages is a speech disparity. The European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the law’s repeal, voting 439 to 52, on April 30, 2026. Beijing dismissed both resolutions as interference in internal matters.

Conclusion

The Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress is the crystallization of a decade of Party ideology into national legislation. Where an earlier policy at least recognized the value of minority languages and cautioned against Han chauvinism, the current law takes the goal of assimilation as its guiding organizing principle. That new regime has already been put to the test through regional laws in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, and was the object of documentation by UN officials, foreign parliaments, and even those minorities whose rights are now being violated. The importance of the new law will only be seen in its application after July 1, 2026, when it can be seen if the law provides for minority-language education, allows for self-governing religious and cultural organizations, and access by independent observers. In the absence of such provisions, all indications suggest that the new law becomes the basis for systematically reforming the identity of millions.

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Jun Hao

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